The Russia-Ukraine War and Global Food Security: Impacts Four Years Later

This report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies analyses how dynamics of war are affecting global agricultural markets and global food security, as well as the Ukrainian and Russian agricultural sectors.

Key findings:

How Russia’s war has affected Ukraine’s agriculture sector, four years later

• In 2025, the Ukraine’s exports of corn, barley, wheat, and meslin—among its top agricultural exports—were 35% lower than 2020. This represents the cumulative impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine’s agricultural sector. Increased export of some grains in 2024 was due to contingent factors and did not represented a real recovery of Ukrainian agriculture.
• Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy, Environment, and Agriculture estimates that at least 10,000 hectares of farmland potentially contaminated with landmine and unexploded ordnance are still being cultivated by farmers
• Damages to irrigation systems is also limiting cultivation; the destruction of the Kakhovka Reservoir in southeastern Ukraine in 2023 left approximately 600,000 hectares of farmland without irrigation.
• Growing labour shortage represents a significant barrier to restoring Ukraine’s agricultural production and export capacity, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian agricultural export infrastructure and ships.

How Russia’s war has affected Russia’s own agriculture sector, four years later 

• Russia’s grain production and exports have been relatively undiminished by the direct effects of the war. Nonetheless, Russia’s agriculture sector has recently been affected by weather and secondary impacts of the war, threatening Russia’s agricultural economy.
• Russia’s wheat exports surged from 39 million metric tons in the 2020–2021 to a record 55 million metric tons in 2023–2024. By 2024, 22% of wheat on global markets was of Russian origin, offering a powerful political leverage in food-importing countries
• Wheat exports in 2025-2026 are estimated at 44 million metric tons, i.e. a 20 % decline from the 2023–2024 record. Currently, 11 new countries are importing Russian grain and seven countries has stopped importing
• Russia aims at increasing grain export by 50% by 2030, but will likely face competition from other exporters and has to deal with labour shortage as it’s loosing 150,000 agricultural workers per year;
• Russia is a top exporter of fertilizer to global markets; Russia’s exports of nitrogen (anhydrous ammonia, urea), phosphate (diammonium phosphate, or DAP), and potassium (potash) fertilizers was affected unevenly. Potash exports fell in 2022 but dramatically recovered since then and almost doubled in 2025 compared to 2021. Exports of urea and DAP have not significantly changed since 2022.

How Russia’s war has affected global agriculture markets and global food security, four years late

• Today, global food prices for cereals, oils,  meat and dairy are generally declining from their 2022 peak. While Ukraine’s exports are falling, exports from other countries have contributed to a more stable global food supply
• However, malnourishment and acute food insecurity have increased since the pre-pandemic levels. The ultimate impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global agriculture markets and global food security is the reduction in output from one of the world’s top agricultural producers

Prospects for the Ukrainian agricultural sector

• It is estimated that losses and damages to Ukraine’s agriculture sector due to the war were amounted to $83.9 billion at the end of 2024 and have almost certainly increased since then. Despite this, Ukraine remains among the world’s top agricultural exporters, expected to rank among the world’s top three exporters of sunflower and rapeseed, the world’s fourth top exporter of corn, and among the top six exporters of wheat, barley, and soybeans in 2026.
• The analysts indicate accession into the European Union as essential to the recovery and future growth of Ukraine’s agriculture sector; this will enable Ukrainian producers to generate higher revenues and reinvest them into critical areas of operation
• Investment priorities include adaptation to climate change and modernization of infrastructure. Ukraine is experiencing increasingly volatile weather patterns: support should this focus on climate-resilient farming systems, including improved seed varieties, agricultural risk insurance, digital weather monitoring, soil conservation practices, and modern irrigation technologies.
• Supporting Ukraine’s agricultural export requires investing in infrastructure such as decentralized grain storage, and decentralised and more efficient irrigation systems such as drip irrigation and other sustainable water management practices
• Negotiating a ceasefire and reaching a peace agreement are needed for the Ukrainian agricultural sector to recover its full potential